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PRECAP; Great Falls Clinic, LLC v. Montana Eighth Judicial District
Court: When is an “Employee” an “Employee”?
Erik Anderson
I. QUESTION PRESENTED
Did the Eighth Judicial District err in finding that the exclusive
remedy provisions of the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act
(“WDEA”) do not apply to the relationship between a business and an
individual before the individual’s first day at work?
This question is of particular importance because the WDEA does
not specifically address exactly when an individual becomes an
“employee” subject to the exclusive remedy provisions of the WDEA.
II. INTRODUCTION
The WDEA was enacted by the legislature to be the exclusive
remedy for wrongfully discharged employees.1 As a compromise between
protecting employees while still allowing employers to have flexibility in
whom they hire and retain, the WDEA allows employers to discharge
employees within a probationary period at the beginning of employment
for “any reason or for no reason.”2 Furthermore, the WDEA preempts any
claim arising in tort or contract.3 Therefore, whether the WDEA and its
probationary period are applicable to an individual’s relationship with a
business is critical in determining an individual’s remedy following an
allegedly wrongful breach early in the relationship.
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Lisa Warrington (“Warrington”) brought this action against Great
Falls Clinic, LLP (“the Clinic”) alleging breach of contract, promissory
estoppel, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.4
In September 2014, Warrington applied for the Clinical Manager
position at the Clinic while she was still employed at Benefis Healthcare
(“Benefis”), her employer for the past 20 years.5 On October 7, 2014, the

1

MONT. CODE ANN. § 39–2–902 (2015).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39–2–904(2)(a) (2015).
3
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39–2–913 (2015).
4
Response to Writ of Supervisory Control at 3, Great Falls Clinic, LLP v. Montana Eighth Judicial
District Court, https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/OP%2016-0335%20Petition%20for%20
Writ%20--%20Response/Objection?id={70237F55-0000-CA22-B8A1-449714F318A6} (Mont. June
23, 2016) (No. OP 16-0335).
5
Id. at 1.
2
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Clinic decided to offer Warrington the position, which she accepted.6
Warrington promptly gave Benefis her two weeks’ notice.7
Two days later, on October 9, 2014, Warrington was sent an
employment agreement from the Clinic that included her terms and
conditions of employment, which she signed and returned.8 In doing so,
she agreed that her start date would be October 27, 2014.9 The agreement
also stated that she would be subject to the Clinic’s typical six-month
probationary period, which begins running for their employees on the
“first date of employment.”10 However, on Warrington’s last day at
Benefis, the Clinic’s Director of Nursing, Lori Henderson (“Henderson”),
called Warrington with an update. Here, the parties’ allegations take a
critical divergence. According to the Clinic, Henderson informed
Warrington over the phone that “the Clinic [had] decided to terminate her
employment.”11 Crucially, Warrington disagrees, claiming that Henderson
had told Warrington that the Clinic had “decided not to employ her after
all.”12 Although word choice is always important, the specific phraseology
used and the definition of specific terms plays an outsized role in this
litigation.
Following commencement of the suit, the parties filed cross
motions for summary judgment on Warrington’s breach of contract and
promissory estoppel claim.13 The District Court granted Warrington’s
motion on the breach of contract claim and denied her motion for summary
judgment regarding promissory estoppel.14 The Clinic filed a Petition for
Supervisory Control with the Montana Supreme Court relating only to the
breach of contract claim.15 The Clinic argued there would be “procedural
entanglements” and an overall savings in judicial economy if the Court
were to exercise its constitutionally granted power of review over the
district court.16 The Court accepted the invitation, partly because the issue
is one of first impression and partly because the issue’s resolution may
prove dispositive of Warrington’s entire case.17

6

Id.
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Response to Writ of Supervisory Control at 1.
11
Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control at 1, Great Falls Clinic, LLP v. Montana Eighth Judicial
District
Court,
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/OP%20160335%20Petition%20for%20Writ%20--%20Response/Objection?id={70237F55-0000-CA22-B8A1449714F318A6} (Mont. June 7, 2016) (No. OP 16-0335).
12
Response to Writ of Supervisory Control at 1.
13
Id. at 3.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control at 7.
17
Order at 1, Great Falls Clinic, LLP v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court,
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/OP%2016-0335%20Respond%20to%20Pleading%20-%20Order?id={80B03655-0000-C71D-9871-CF4B3B0FF36B} (Mont. July 12, 2016) (No. OP 160335).
7
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IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A. Petitioner Great Falls Clinic, LLP
The Clinic argues that Warrington was a full-fledged employee of
the Clinic at the time they contacted her on her last day at Benefis, that she
had agreed to an employment contract, and that she was not covered by a
collective bargaining agreement.18 Based on these facts, the Clinic
maintains that the WDEA must apply and, further, that it provides her
exclusive remedy.19 The Clinic contends that the law is clear in regards to
WDEA preemption of common-law claims, such as breach of contract,
when “a party’s claims are inextricably intertwined with their
termination.”20
The Clinic supports their argument with excerpts of legislative
history from HB241, which it claims reveals that the WDEA was intended
for actions of wrongful discharge even when the discharge is
“prospective.”21 The fact that Warrington had signed an employment
agreement, but had not yet reached her start date, leads the Clinic to
assume that its action qualified as “prospective discharge.”22 Furthermore,
the Clinic maintains that its decision to “terminate” Warrington falls under
the definition of “discharge” as defined by the WDEA.23 The Clinic’s
entire argument is premised on the fact that Warrington became an
“employee” of the Clinic the moment she signed her employment
agreement. The Clinic ends by noting the inconsistency in the district
court’s conclusion that Warrington signed an employment contract, but
somehow shouldn’t be considered an “employee.”24
B. Response of Warrington on behalf of Montana Eighth Judicial
District Court
In her response, Warrington maintains that she never became an
“employee,” that the Clinic never became an “employer,” and that
Warrington could therefore never have been “discharged.”25 To support
this argument, Warrington relies on Judge Kutzman’s reasoning in the
district court proceeding as well as the reasoning of a separate district court
ruling with similar facts.26

18

Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control at 10.
Id. at 8.
Id.
21
Id. at 11.
22
Id.
23
Id. (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 39–2–903(2) (2015)).
24
Petition for Writ of Supervisory Control at 10.
25
Response to Writ of Supervisory Control at 2.
26
Id. at 3 (citing Simpson v. Benefis Hospital Inc., Docket No. DDV-09-321).
19
20
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Channeling her inner Merriam and Webster, Warrington details
an extensive list of definitions, all but one of which are pulled directly out
of the WDEA, which collectively suggest that a person is only an
employee when he or she “works” for an employer.27 Warrington argues
that, because she never performed services for the Clinic and never
received any wages or salary or benefits from the Clinic, she could not
have actually “worked” for the Clinic.28 In her opinion, she was never even
allowed to begin her probationary period.29 To support this, Warrington
cites a recent Montana Supreme Court case in which the Court held that
the only “reasonable construction” of when the six-month probationary
period begins to run is when the employee “began work” for her new
employer.30
In a footnote, Warrington highlights the fact that the Clinic’s
employee handbook elaborates on the purpose of a probationary period.31
The handbook describes it as a period that is used to determine if the
employee is a “good fit,” and gives the employee a chance to “get
oriented…to the job.”32 The implication is that the Clinic only finds their
probationary period useful once the employee has begun performing work
for them, so it defies common sense to believe it starts prior to that
occurrence. Because the probationary period is an essential part of the
WDEA and the Court has suggested it only begins when the individual
“begins to work” for the employer, Warrington concludes that the
exclusive remedy provisions should similarly start only after the
individual “begins to work.”
Next, Warrington counters the Clinic’s use of legislative history
with the plain meaning rule of statutory interpretation. Because the
language in the WDEA expresses clearly and unambiguously that the
statute only applies during employment, legislative history should be left
out of the Court’s analysis. Warrington further argues that, even if the
legislative history were instructive, it would weigh, instead, in her favor,
as the WDEA was enacted in part to prevent employers from taking
advantage of employees.33 Warrington claims that the legislature never
intended, in enacting the WDEA, to protect employers who perform “baitand-switch” tactics to achieve a competitive advantage.34
Finally, Warrington makes an appeal to public policy.35 She
begins by suggesting employers may be practicing similar “bait-and-

27

Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
29
Id.
30
Id at 7 (citing Blehm v. St. John’s Lutheran Hosp., 2010 MT 258, ¶16, 358 Mont. 300, 246 P.3d
1024).
31
Response to Writ of Supervisory Control at 2 n. 8.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 11.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 10.
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switch” hiring techniques on a regular basis and in direct conflict with the
purpose of the WDEA.36 If employers are allowed to “terminate” a new
employee before giving them a chance to work, a new employer could
simply steal good employees from a competitor, thereby gaining a
competitive advantage, all without any repercussions. Worse, the
employee is left without a job and with nowhere to turn.
V. ANALYSIS
The Court granted the Clinic’s petition for supervisory control,
concluding that the case presents a threshold issue of first impression. To
promote judicial efficiency and justice, the threshold issue must first be
resolved. The Court clarified that it would only be addressing the
applicability of the WDEA to the specific facts in Warrington’s case, with
no further consideration of the remedies available to her if the WDEA does
not apply. 37
Warrington’s argument in this case appears persuasive. The
identification of at least one other district court opinion that reached the
same conclusion, while not binding authority, is telling. Furthermore, the
assumptions made by the Clinic are hard to ignore. Rather than argue that
Warrington was actually an employee and therefore subject to the WDEA,
the Clinic focuses on the applicability of the WDEA to someone who is
already assumed to be an employee. But as Warrington explains, the crux
of the issue is whether she was actually employed by the Clinic at the time
she was notified by Henderson. A deeper analysis of the employment
agreement and terms and conditions likely would have been more
persuasive.
On the other hand, the argument by Warrington that she should
not be consider an employee because she never “worked” a day for the
Clinic is not incredibly convincing. Although Warrington signed an
employment agreement, she suggests the plain meaning of “works for,”
within the MCA definition of “employee,” can only be interpreted to mean
that the person has physically “clocked-in” for the employer. However, an
alternate interpretation could simply be that a person “works for” an
employer when she is “in the employment of” a person or organization.
Warrington may well be included within that definition.
Ultimately, the Court’s determination will likely come down to an
interpretation of the purpose of the WDEA, with an eye toward previous
WDEA decisions. In order for the Court to reconcile its unanimous
holding in Blehm, it will likely agree that the exclusive remedy provision
of the WDEA, like that of the probationary period, begins to apply when
the individual “starts to work” — that is, when the employer begins to
36
37

Response to Writ of Supervisory Control at 10.
Order at 1.
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make use of the individual in an employment capacity.38 Whether such an
interpretation would put an end to such unethical hiring, or whether
businesses would simply wait until the probationary period becomes
applicable, remains to be seen.

Notably, Black’s first sense of “employ” is “to make use of.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 639
(Bryan A. Garner ed., 10th ed. 2009).
38

